
How to ask a question...

Dr. Brock will be asking for questions in between topics as well as at the end.

To Ask a Question:

- 1. "Raise your hand" by clicking the hand button. This will prompt the administrator to un-mute you and then you can speak into your microphone.
- 2. Or type your question into the "Questions" field, and Woody will answer.

Menu located in upper-right corner of your screen



WEBINAR: Oct 11, 2011

Topic 1: The Malaise in the West: The Collision of Two Fronts

Topic 2: A Risk Assessment of the Euro Crisis

- Implications for the World Economy -



H. "Woody" Brock, Ph.D.

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Topic 1: Malaise in the West: Collision of Two Fronts

- Continuing Aftershocks of the Global Financial Crisis and its Recession
- Foreboding of those Demography / "Entitlements"
 Shocks to Come
- Growing Recognition of Political Paralysis Everywhere
- Reasons for Political Paralysis and Lack of Leadership Everywhere – the Mancur Olson Argument

Topic 2: A Risk Assessment of the Euro Crisis - Implications for the World Economy -

- "Monetary Union is Impossible without Political Union." What does this really mean? Which should come first, and why?
- Economic/Monetary Integration is a meaningful concept, but only if "macro-controllability" is understood.

Jan Tinbergen's Theorem, 1953

Controllability: If a country has **n** goals or "targets," it must possess **m** ≥ **n** independent control variables or "policy instruments."


Controllability Before and After Currency Union

Before Currency Union - For Every Country -										
3 Targe	3 Targets:		Inflation		Employment		lance			
4 Instruments:	Money Growth		Interest Rate		Fisc	al Policy	Currency Value			
Each nation possessed Controllability: m - n = 1										

After Currency Union - For Every Country -									
3 Target	s: Inf	flation	Employmen	t Trade Ba	alance				
1 Instrument:	Money Grov	vth Int	erest Rate	Fiscal Policy	Currency Value				
No nation possesses Controllability: m – n = -2									

A Sobering Tradeoff

- Welfare Loss from Currency Union versus Economic Correlation-



The Moral: The less the correlation between the economic fundamentals of all **K** nations, the greater the social welfare loss due to a currency union.


Source: SED

Correlation of Real GDP Changes 1980—2010

	<u>Austria</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Cyprus</u>	<u>Finland</u>	<u>France</u>	Germany	<u>Greece</u>	<u>Ireland</u>	<u>ltaly</u>	<u>Lux.</u>	Nether.	<u>Portugal</u>	<u>Spain</u>
Austria	1.00	0.67	0.39	0.52	0.69	0.75	0.39	0.58	0.56	0.64	0.76	0.54	0.69
Belgium		1.00	0.60	0.68	0.82	0.70	0.47	0.65	0.69	0.64	0.71	0.62	0.76
Cyprus			1.00	0.42	0.62	0.47	0.15	0.31	0.60	0.24	0.41	0.46	0.51
Finland				1.00	0.74	0.33	0.38	0.59	0.59	0.42	0.57	0.38	0.65
France					1.00	0.68	0.44	0.63	0.82	0.73	0.71	0.67	0.86
Germany						1.00	0.29	0.42	0.75	0.71	0.80	0.56	0.61
Greece							1.00	0.55	0.36	0.45	0.50	0.03	0.62
Ireland								1.00	0.55	0.49	0.67	0.47	0.71
Italy									1.00	0.70	0.76	0.49	0.79
Luxembourg				Avera	age = 0	.58				1.00	0.74	0.49	0.69
Netherlands											1.00	0.46	0.76
Portugal												1.00	0.59
Spain													1.00

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database

Risk Assessment of the Euro Crisis



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